It had always been understood between him (Churchill) and President Roosevelt that we were not bound to the reduction of Imperial Preference. Such preferences were the slender silken but strong girdle which bound together the 70 million Britons scattered over the face of the world. It was no more, and no less legitimate than the American tariff.
(L. H. E. Bury)
There is no quid pro quo for Empire preference and to imagine that some possible tariff reductions in the United States tariff will provide compensating advantages is more than wishful thinking -it is sheer wilful [sic] self-deception.
(Associated Chambers of Manufactures of Australia)
Throughout the Anglo-American loan negotiations of 1945, the dominion governments had clamoured for information and inclusion in the decision-making process. In 1946 the tables were turned. Now Britain encouraged consultation with the dominions, in the hope it would lead to a collective approach at the coming international commercial meetings at Geneva. (Hereafter this conference will be referred to as the Geneva conference on trade and employment, or Geneva conference for short.) However, the governments of South Africa, Canada and Australia were not eager to meet in Commonwealth forums. In part their reluctance stemmed from the need to digest the US trade and employment proposals of December 1945 in national councils; Commonwealth meetings were premature. These three dominions were also unwilling to gather in London because they did not believe the Commonwealth was the most appropriate or effective forum to consider trade policy. Only the Fraser government of New Zealand welcomed the prospect of Commonwealth consultation.
As a result, there were no Commonwealth or international trade meetings until October 1946. The postponement of meetings, however, did not mean that everything was on hold in the intervening ten months. In fact, the economic and political circumstances of the immediate postwar period made it difficult for American and Commonwealth governments to implement free trade practices. Moreover, with the end of the war and the defeat of common enemies, the most powerful glue holding the wartime allies together dissolved. National interests superceded international objectives and cooperation.
The body of this chapter examines the three preparatory meetings in this period, two for the Commonwealth and one for all of the members of the nuclear group invited to Geneva. For the Commonwealth, these meetings were held to clarify members' policies as the British hoped to identify areas of cooperation and agreement prior to tariff negotiations in Geneva. The single international gathering revealed how participation in international gatherings would affect the workings of the Commonwealth. Would members of the Commonwealth stick together? Would they constitute some kind of recognizable bloc? Or would Commonwealth members simply disperse in the larger gathering, finding allies wherever they could? Although little concrete happened at these meetings, the interval from January 1946 until April 1947 was a telling period in the evolution of the Commonwealth, as it shifted gears from wartime to peacetime.
Two steps forward, one step back
In the State Department campaign to secure congressional support for the loan to Britain, officials repeatedly linked financial aid to the end of imperial preference. As US under-secretary of state for economic affairs Will Clayton explained, without the loan Britain would have no option but to 'tighten and cement the economic ties which bind the British Empire' through the sterling area and imperial preference, and the US would have lost its best chance to enlist Britain to its freer trade cause. 3 In an appearance on NBC radio's University of the Air Dean Acheson, the under-secretary at the State Department, also linked imperial preference to the loan by explaining that Britain had 'agreed to support the American proposals to reduce and eventually eliminate
